work in progress
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+29
-5
@@ -90,10 +90,21 @@ deferred UX decision.
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bundle fetch, alpha_hash recomputation.
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- `key_exchange` — verification passed; performing X25519 key agreement and
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ML-KEM-768 encapsulation; sending `kem_ciphertext` to backend relay.
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- `pin_display` — run key derived; PIN displayed to user. User reads
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the PIN, confirms the match on the extension, then taps Continue on the
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companion to advance. The companion does not receive a signal from the
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extension; the two devices proceed independently from this point.
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- `pin_display` — run key derived; PIN displayed to user. User reads the
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PIN and taps Continue on the companion once they've compared it.
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- `awaiting_confirmation` — user has tapped Continue; polling
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`GET /run/relay/:runId/confirm` (interfaces.md, "PIN confirmation") for
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the extension's own confirmation, which only exists once its user has
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separately clicked Confirm there. Advancing requires both: this device's
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local tap and the other device's remote signal, neither one alone.
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Superseded design note: an earlier version of this document had the
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companion proceed the instant its own user tapped Continue, with "the
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companion does not receive a signal from the extension." That turned out
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to be weaker than necessary for no real benefit — Bluetooth-style
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Numeric Comparison pairing has always communicated the confirmation
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between devices as part of completing the handshake, and there was no
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good reason for this protocol to do less. See interfaces.md's "PIN
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confirmation" section for the wire-level detail.
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- `credential_select` — credentials for the current site presented; vault
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already unlocked from biometric at session initiation. If exactly one
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credential is stored for the site it may be pre-selected. If multiple are
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@@ -132,7 +143,13 @@ key_exchange
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→ error/relay_error (network: cannot send kem_ciphertext)
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pin_display
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→ credential_select (user taps Continue)
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→ awaiting_confirmation (user taps Continue)
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→ idle (user cancels; run key discarded)
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awaiting_confirmation
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→ credential_select (extension's confirmation received)
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→ error/confirmation_timeout (bounded wait elapses with no confirmation —
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network class, retry offered)
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→ idle (user cancels; run key discarded)
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credential_select
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@@ -170,6 +187,11 @@ warning; no retry offered):
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*Network class* (transient; retry offered):
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- `backend_unreachable` — key bundle fetch failed.
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- `relay_error` — could not send `kem_ciphertext` or credential ciphertext.
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- `confirmation_timeout` — polled for the extension's PIN confirmation
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past a bounded wait with no response. Not security-class: the absence of
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a signal isn't evidence of tampering, just that the other side hasn't
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(yet, or ever) clicked Confirm — could be an inattentive user, a closed
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tab, or a genuine network issue.
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---
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@@ -221,6 +243,8 @@ All algorithm parameters and normative ordering rules are in `../crypto.md`.
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- Fetch key bundle by run ID (at-most-once; bundle destroyed on fetch).
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- Send `kem_ciphertext` to relay addressed to run ID (Phase 2).
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- Poll for the extension's PIN confirmation, addressed to run ID
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(`awaiting_confirmation`, above).
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- Send encrypted credential ciphertext to relay addressed to run ID (Phase 4).
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- Report security-class errors to `/security/report`.
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