happy path working with stub companion app
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+18
-21
@@ -90,21 +90,21 @@ deferred UX decision.
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bundle fetch, alpha_hash recomputation.
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- `key_exchange` — verification passed; performing X25519 key agreement and
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ML-KEM-768 encapsulation; sending `kem_ciphertext` to backend relay.
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- `pin_display` — run key derived; PIN displayed to user. User reads the
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PIN and taps Continue on the companion once they've compared it.
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- `awaiting_confirmation` — user has tapped Continue; polling
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`GET /run/relay/:runId/confirm` (interfaces.md, "PIN confirmation") for
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the extension's own confirmation, which only exists once its user has
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separately clicked Confirm there. Advancing requires both: this device's
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local tap and the other device's remote signal, neither one alone.
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Superseded design note: an earlier version of this document had the
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companion proceed the instant its own user tapped Continue, with "the
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companion does not receive a signal from the extension." That turned out
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to be weaker than necessary for no real benefit — Bluetooth-style
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Numeric Comparison pairing has always communicated the confirmation
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between devices as part of completing the handshake, and there was no
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good reason for this protocol to do less. See interfaces.md's "PIN
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confirmation" section for the wire-level detail.
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- `pin_display` — run key derived; PIN displayed to user for comparison
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against the extension's independently-derived PIN — that visual
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comparison is the actual anti-MITM check, not a gate the companion enforces
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itself. No local action is required or offered here: the companion polls
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`GET /run/relay/:runId/confirm` (interfaces.md, "PIN confirmation")
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automatically the instant the PIN is derived, and advances the moment the
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extension's user clicks Confirm there — that single click is the only
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human action gating the run. Design history: this document previously
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described a two-way handshake (companion's own tap *and* the extension's
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signal, neither sufficient alone), reasoning from Bluetooth-style Numeric
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Comparison pairing. That was reverted — no benefit was found in a second,
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companion-side tap once the PIN is already independently displayed and
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visually checked; it was pure friction on a device that has nothing
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further to decide. See interfaces.md's "PIN confirmation" section for the
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wire-level detail.
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- `credential_select` — credentials for the current site presented; vault
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already unlocked from biometric at session initiation. If exactly one
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credential is stored for the site it may be pre-selected. If multiple are
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@@ -143,11 +143,8 @@ key_exchange
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→ error/relay_error (network: cannot send kem_ciphertext)
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pin_display
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→ awaiting_confirmation (user taps Continue)
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→ idle (user cancels; run key discarded)
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awaiting_confirmation
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→ credential_select (extension's confirmation received)
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→ credential_select (extension's confirmation received — polled
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automatically, no local action)
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→ error/confirmation_timeout (bounded wait elapses with no confirmation —
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network class, retry offered)
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→ idle (user cancels; run key discarded)
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@@ -244,7 +241,7 @@ All algorithm parameters and normative ordering rules are in `../crypto.md`.
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- Fetch key bundle by run ID (at-most-once; bundle destroyed on fetch).
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- Send `kem_ciphertext` to relay addressed to run ID (Phase 2).
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- Poll for the extension's PIN confirmation, addressed to run ID
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(`awaiting_confirmation`, above).
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(`pin_display`, above).
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- Send encrypted credential ciphertext to relay addressed to run ID (Phase 4).
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- Report security-class errors to `/security/report`.
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